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ARC-003CONFIDENCIAL · AnonimizadoCRÍTICO
Threat framework on an e-commerce platform with payment gateway
Structured analysis of 14 threats on a B2C online store (500–2,000 orders/month, 15,000 records). Four critical ones concentrated in payment fraud, checkout injection, card-data exfiltration and identity spoofing. Significant exposure to PCI DSS v4.0 and GDPR.
Analysis type
Threat modeling · STRIDE + OWASP
Sector
E-commerce B2C · WooCommerce
Status
Closed
Date
2025
STRIDEOWASPMagecartPCI DSSRGPDSQLiIDORDDoS
01
Context
- ·Partially up-to-date WooCommerce on WordPress, 25+ active plugins.
- ·External payment gateway via iframe + basic tokenisation, shared hosting + CDN.
- ·No customer MFA; third-party integrations (GA, Pixel, marketing) on the attack surface.
02
Methodology
- ·STRIDE (Spoofing · Tampering · Repudiation · Info Disclosure · DoS · Elevation).
- ·OWASP Top 10 e-commerce as sector filter.
- ·Probability × Impact risk matrix; mitigation plan by horizon (0–30 / 1–3m / 3–6m).
03
Findings
01AME-001 · Magecart / JS skimming
CRÍTICO02AME-002 · SQLi in search/API parameters
CRÍTICO03AME-004 · Chargeback fraud without robust logs
ALTO04AME-005 · Outdated plugins (supply chain)
ALTO05AME-006 · Volumetric DDoS on checkout
MEDIO06AME-007 · IDOR on order access
MEDIO04
Operational impact
- ·Direct financial fraud + PCI DSS v4.0 breach (fines and possible payment-operations halt).
- ·GDPR risk: up to €20M or 4% of global annual turnover.
- ·Best cost/benefit control: CSP + SRI on checkout scripts (immediate Magecart mitigation).
05
Full document
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12 pp· 84 KB· PDF
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